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THE SUPREME COURT, STARE DECISIS, AND THE ROLE OF
APPELLATE DEFERENCE IN PATENT CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION APPEALS
DAVID KRINSKY*
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviews de
novo the rulings of district judges about patent claim construction.
This state of affairs—surprising to many lawyers who are unfamil-
iar with patent law—is controversial because claim construction is
one of the most important and vexing aspects of patent litigation,
necessary to the vast majority of patent cases, and because it is proba-
bly responsible, at least in part, for the high reversal rate in patent
cases.  Commentary by both scholars and judges about the standard
of review in patent cases has centered on whether the Federal Circuit
should change it and review claim construction rulings with
deference.
This commentary relies on a flawed assumption.  The Federal
Circuit lacks the authority to review claim construction rulings defer-
entially, because de novo review is required by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.  In particu-
lar, the Supreme Court stated that claim construction rulings are
entitled to stare decisis.
This Article argues that deference should be granted to the fac-
tual findings and acquired technical expertise underlying district
courts’ claim construction rulings in at least some limited cases—but
it also explains why change must and should come from the Supreme
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION: PHILLIPS AND ITS DISSENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 R
II. THE DEFERENCE THAT IS NEEDED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 R
A. The Peculiar Position of Patents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 R
B. De Novo as a Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 R
Copyright  2006 by David Krinsky.
* J.D., summa cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center, 2005; A.B. in Physics,
cum laude, Harvard College, 1999.  The author was a law clerk during the 2005–06 term to
the Honorable Roger W. Titus, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, and is
currently a law clerk to the Honorable Richard Linn, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.  The opinions presented herein are those of neither judge, but of the author
alone.  The author would like to thank James Grimmelmann, Anthony Shaw, John
Thomas, Bruce Wieder, and above all, his wife, Augusta Ridley, for their insightful com-
ments on various drafts of this Article.
194
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR104.txt unknown Seq: 2  8-DEC-06 11:56
2006] DEFERENCE IN PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION APPEALS 195
III. THE DEFERENCE THAT PRECEDENT REQUIRES AND HOW
TO FIX IT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 R
A. What Cybor Compels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 R
B. What Markman Compels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 R
1. Claim Construction as a Matter of Law . . . . . . . . . 218 R
2. Estoppel Versus Stare Decisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 R
C. How to Fix Markman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 R
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 R
I. INTRODUCTION: PHILLIPS AND ITS DISSENTS
On July 12, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit issued an en banc opinion in Phillips v. AWH Corp.,1 a pat-
ent infringement lawsuit concerning modular wall panels intended
for use in constructing prisons.  At issue—besides a prison panel pat-
ent—was nothing less than the basic question of how district courts
should construe patent claims, and in particular the relationship be-
tween a patent’s specification and its claims.  In the words of the
court, this “has been an issue in patent law decisions in this country
for nearly two centuries.”2  The Phillips en banc opinion will no doubt
be a starting point for the practice of claim construction—and thus a
centerpiece of patent litigation—for the foreseeable future.
But the Phillips opinion is perhaps more notable for what it did
not resolve than what it did.  In its order granting a rehearing en
banc, the court had asked the parties and the patent bar to brief a
series of seven questions.3  Although Question 7—using the number-
1. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
2. Id. at 1312.
3. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(granting rehearing en banc).  The seven questions read as follows:
This court has determined to hear this case en banc in order to resolve issues
concerning the construction of patent claims raised by the now-vacated panel ma-
jority and dissenting opinions.  The parties are invited to submit additional briefs
directed to these issues, with respect particularly to the following questions:
1.  Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by referencing
primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to
interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in
the specification?  If both sources are to be consulted, in what order?
2.  If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpretation,
should the specification limit the full scope of claim language (as defined by the
dictionaries) only when the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when
the specification reflects a clear disclaimer of claim scope?  If so, what language in
the specification will satisfy those conditions?  What use should be made of gen-
eral as opposed to technical dictionaries?  How does the concept of ordinary
meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term?  If
the dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a term, is it
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ing of the Phillips rehearing order—asked what deference the Federal
Circuit can and should give to claim construction rulings by trial
courts,4 the Phillips court, in its en banc opinion, simply “decided not
to address that issue at this time.”5  This decision—and thus Phillips’s
underlying premise that there even can exist a purely legal framework
for construing patent claims—drew a scathing dissent by Judge Mayer,
joined by Judge Newman.6
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview In-
struments, Inc.7 and the Federal Circuit’s decisions in that case8 and in
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,9 claim construction has been con-
sidered to be a matter of pure law and has accordingly been reviewed
de novo on appeal by the Federal Circuit, “including any allegedly
appropriate to look to the specification to determine what definition or defini-
tions should apply?
3.  If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification,
what use should be made of dictionaries?  Should the range of the ordinary
meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed in
the specification, for example, when only a single embodiment is disclosed and
no other indications of breadth are disclosed?
4.  Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority
and dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting ap-
proaches, should the two approaches be treated as complementary methodolo-
gies such that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must
satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish the claim coverage it
seeks?
5.  When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole
purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112?
6.  What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of ordi-
nary skill in the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed claim terms?
7.  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview In-
struments, Inc., and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., is it
appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court
claim construction rulings?  If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to
what extent?
Id. (citations omitted).
Like the Federal Circuit, this Article uses “claim construction” and “claim interpreta-
tion” interchangeably. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 n.6
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“The dissenting opinion draws a
distinction between claim interpretation and claim construction based on the distinction
made in contract law.  We do not make the same distinction for, in our view, the terms
mean one and the same thing in patent law.”).
4. Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1383.
5. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328.
6. Id. at 1330–35 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
7. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
8. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
9. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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fact-based questions relating to claim construction.”10  This state of
affairs has been controversial.  Judge Mayer, for example, described
“any attempt to fashion a coherent standard under this regime” as
“pointless,” accused the court of “focus[ing] inappropriate power” in
itself, and further attacked the court for “decid[ing] cases according
to whatever mode or method results in the outcome we desire.”11  In
dissent from the Phillips rehearing order, then-Chief Judge Mayer
wrote that “[n]early a decade of confusion has resulted from the fic-
tion that claim construction is a matter of law, when it is obvious that
it depends on underlying factual determinations . . . reviewable on
appeal for clear error.”12  In his view, the Federal Circuit should re-
consider its holdings in Markman and Cybor, a possibility that the word-
ing of Question 7 appeared to deliberately avoid.13  Several of the
amicus briefs in Phillips urged a similar position, arguing that underly-
ing factual determinations should be reviewed for clear error.14
As both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have ex-
plained, however, there are compelling reasons to treat claim con-
struction—at least in the ordinary case—as a matter of pure law.
Patent claims delineate the scope of an invention from which the pat-
entee has a government grant of the right to exclude others; as such,
the public should be able to rely upon a consistent construction of
patent claims based only upon the documents available in the public
record.15  Other legal instruments are construed by courts as matters
of law rather than fact, and it is reasonable that patents be treated
10. Id. at 1456.
11. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
12. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting
from order granting rehearing en banc).
13. Id. at 1383.  Question 7 asked, if “[c]onsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Markman and our en banc decision in Cybor, is it appropriate . . . to accord any deference to
any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings?” Id. (citations omitted).  This suggests
that the en banc Federal Circuit did not intend to consider overruling Cybor, though it was
(and is) obviously empowered to do so.  Likewise, although the Federal Circuit is not em-
powered to overrule the Supreme Court’s Markman decision, as an en banc court it can
overrule its own Markman decision to the extent that doing so is consistent with binding
Supreme Court precedent.
14. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Connecticut Intellectual Property Law Ass’n Re-
garding the Issue of Claim Construction at 10–11, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Nos. 03–1269, 03–1286), available at http://paten-
tlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/CS4555.pdf (supporting the “clearly erroneous” standard
for claim construction appeals).
15. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR104.txt unknown Seq: 5  8-DEC-06 11:56
198 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:194
similarly.16  Finally, at least in principle, treatment as a matter of law
may promote uniformity in how claims are construed.17  Unlike ques-
tions of fact, questions of law are generally entitled to stare decisis
effect in addition to collateral estoppel.18  And unlike collateral estop-
pel, which can ordinarily bind only the parties to the action in which
an issue is decided, stare decisis may preclude reconsideration of an
issue that is asserted by a party who has never before litigated the
question.19  Thus, if a particular claim construction is entitled to stare
decisis effect, it will (at least in theory) apply in all future lawsuits in
which it is at issue.20
At the same time, even the Markman and Cybor courts acknowl-
edged that judges, though definitionally skilled in the law, are not
necessarily skilled in the art to which a patent pertains, and that ex-
trinsic evidence—any evidence outside the public record of the patent
document and its file wrapper, including expert testimony21—may
help the court put itself in the position of a person of ordinary skill in
the art.22
16. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“The con-
struction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to
do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.”).
17. Id. at 390.
18. See generally Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260
F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that collateral estoppel may apply to questions
of law, but will not apply to questions of law litigated anew in “substantially unrelated”
actions).
19. See id.
20. See id.  Whether a decision that is entitled to stare decisis effect will be binding on
future courts that consider the same issue, or whether it will merely be persuasive, depends
on the courts involved. See id. at 1373 (“[S]tare decisis is a doctrine that binds courts to
follow their own earlier decisions or the decisions of a superior tribunal.”); see also infra
note 129.  Either way, a claim construction that is entitled to some form of stare decisis R
effect is more likely to be applied uniformly across multiple patent infringement suits than
a claim construction that is litigated anew by each new defendant.  In particular, if a claim
construction is adopted by the Federal Circuit, that construction would be binding in dis-
trict court infringement actions nationwide. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (noting the
uniformity conferred by the exclusive national appellate jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit).
21. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“Extrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to
the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries,
and learned treatises.”).
22. Id. at 981 (“[I]t is permissible, and often necessary, to receive expert evidence to
ascertain the meaning of a technical or scientific term or term of art so that the court may
be aided in understanding . . . what [the instruments] actually say.” (alterations in original)
(quoting U.S. Indus. Chems., Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 315 U.S. 668, 678
(1942))); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(discussing the effect of extrinsic evidence on the court).
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Phillips was decided without addressing the question at all—cor-
rectly, as the claim construction at issue did not involve any findings
based on extrinsic evidence or expert testimony.23  Yet the question
remains as important and challenging as ever.
In Part II, this Article argues that the Federal Circuit’s reasoning
in Markman and Cybor is compelling, and that claim construction rul-
ings should ordinarily be considered decisions of law and reviewed de
novo.  It also argues, however, that the Federal Circuit—despite its
undoubted technical expertise24—is not and cannot be skilled in
every technical field.  Thus, when trial judges have heard testimony
intended to put them in the position of one skilled in the art, the
Federal Circuit should grant deference to the decisions the trial judge
makes about how particular technical claim terms are understood by
practitioners of the art.  In essence, it argues that then-Chief Judge
Mayer’s dissenting comments in the Phillips rehearing order are cor-
rect, and that deference should be given to underlying trial court fact-
finding—but only in the exceptional case where recourse to extrinsic
testimony is necessary and appropriate.
This conclusion, however, must be squared with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Markman.  Part III of the Article questions whether
this sort of deference is within the Federal Circuit’s power to grant,
and concludes on the basis of Markman that it is not.  In particular, for
reasons that Part III explores, the Supreme Court’s holding that claim
constructions should be granted stare decisis effect implies that they
cannot be based on fact-finding about which the Federal Circuit has
granted deference to a trial court.  The Article concludes that the Su-
preme Court should clarify or overrule Markman and hold that trial
judges may make use of extrinsic evidence to help put them in the
position of practitioners of ordinary skill in the art; that when they do
so, their factual rulings are entitled to appellate deference; and that
stare decisis is appropriate only as to legal matters that do not require
particularized technical expertise, if then.  Notably, as Part IV will ar-
gue in conclusion, the Phillips court was right not to tackle these ques-
tions: Phillips was not an appropriate case in which to decide them.
But another case may soon arise that is a fitting candidate for consid-
23. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324–28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
24. See, e.g., Robert D. Wallick & Neil R. Ellis, The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit: At the Leading Edge of High Technology Issues, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 801, 803 (1987)
(“[T]he highly technical and complex nature of the many patent cases heard by the CAFC
demonstrates . . . that the court is a technology-conscious legal body highly qualified to
hear, assess, and decide technical patent appeals from both judicial and administrative
decisions.”).
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eration by an en banc Federal Circuit and—one hopes—a grant of
certiorari.
II. THE DEFERENCE THAT IS NEEDED
A. The Peculiar Position of Patents
“[A] patent is both a technical and a legal document.”25  With
this pithy observation, Judge Michel summarized the fundamental dif-
ficulty with claim construction and, by extension, the fundamental dif-
ficulty with deciding how claim construction should be conducted and
reviewed on appeal.26  Patents are carefully drafted legal documents
whose interpretation is based on over two hundred years of case law
and on doctrines that are not always obvious even to nonpatent attor-
neys.  For instance, even though the Federal Circuit has repeatedly
counseled that claim language is entitled to a “heavy presumption in
favor of [its] ordinary meaning,”27 this is only true through the lens of
counterintuitive patent law doctrines such as the doctrine of
equivalents (which expands the set of infringing embodiments be-
yond the literal scope of the claims)28 and means-plus-function claims
(which, contrary to their literal readings, do not cover all “means for”
performing the stated function, but instead cover only structures that
are identical or equivalent to the ones that perform the stated func-
tion in the embodiments described by the patent’s specification, not
any “means for” performing the stated function).29  At the same time,
patents are technical documents that often require consideration of
concepts, conventions, and terms of art from abstruse scientific and
engineering disciplines.30  Understanding their meaning requires
25. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
26. Id.
27. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
28. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(holding that the doctrine of equivalents is founded on the theory that “if two devices do
the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result,
they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape” (quoting Machine Co.
v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877))).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (2000) (“An element in a claim for a combination may
be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.”).
30. See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1307 (discussing how the term “spot size” refers by
convention in the digital printing art to the area in which “the intensity exceeds a fixed
threshold”); see also Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing a
patent on a DNA sequence encoding fibroblast beta-interferon and quoting a party as
describing one of the relevant technologies as “routine to those skilled in the art”).
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consideration of what their terms mean to those of ordinary skill in
the art, so expertise in patent law is not enough to construe them
correctly.31
This dichotomy is a source of tension in how patent claims are
interpreted and in how those constructions are reviewed on appeal.
On the one hand, treating patents as legal documents suggests that
they are best construed by judges skilled in patent law, using only the
public record associated with each patent: the text of the patent docu-
ments themselves and their prosecution histories.32  This approach
counsels in favor of de novo review, as questions of law are tradition-
ally reviewed without deference.33  Moreover, because Federal Circuit
judges have particular expertise in patent law, they are generally bet-
ter equipped than district court judges to apply patent law doctrines
correctly.34  The legal approach, broadly speaking, is what the Federal
Circuit has generally taken.  Claim construction is conducted by refer-
ence to the intrinsic evidence alone—the words of the claims them-
selves, the rest of the specification, and the prosecution history—
unless, in light of that evidence, a claim term is still ambiguous.35
31. See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes
the claims are construed.”).
32. The prosecution history of a patent forms “part of the public record and shed[s]
light on the meaning of the claims.”  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp.,
157 F.3d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Nonetheless, there is some debate about the extent to
which the prosecution history should inform the construction of claims in a patent. See,
e.g., John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution
Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183 (1999).   Indeed, this is one of
the questions that the Federal Circuit considered in Phillips. See supra note 3.  Considera- R
tion of this debate is beyond the scope of this Article; the “legal document” approach to
claim construction rests only upon an assumption that patents can be construed by reading
the intrinsic evidence.  What that intrinsic evidence comprises is not important, so long as
it is publicly available.
33. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (holding that “a court of
appeals should review de novo a district court’s determinations of state law”).
34. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 17–18 (2001).  Moore points out, however, that Justice Jackson’s
famous phrase, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only be-
cause we are final,” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring),
applies in some respects to the Federal Circuit on matters of patent law.  Moore, supra, at
17–18.  The Federal Circuit is not formally final—the Supreme Court can review its deci-
sions—but in practice the Federal Circuit is frequently left to craft patent law doctrines on
its own. See Nicolas Oettinger, In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 334–37 (2001) (arguing that even after taking into account the
fact that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction largely eliminates circuit splits about
issues of patent law, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to let the Federal Circuit
make sweeping changes in patent law).
35. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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And, of course, patent claim construction is reviewed entirely de
novo.36
On the other hand, the legal approach ignores, or at least under-
plays, the reality that many patents pertain to technical subjects.  The
meaning of a patent claim term is “what one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time of the invention would have understood the term to
mean.”37  The Federal Circuit is a court of extremely competent
judges, with clerks skilled in a variety of technical disciplines,38 but
they are not and cannot be “of ordinary skill” in every art.  No one can
be skilled in every technical discipline he or she encounters, or even
in more than a select few—scientific knowledge is too fine-grained
and broad-ranging.  From an institutional standpoint, an emphasis on
the technical aspects of patents suggests that claim construction would
ideally be conducted by one skilled in the art—a technical expert of
some sort.  Since that is not ordinarily practical, at least without alter-
ing the practice of handling patent infringement through suits in
courts, judges must take steps, sometimes including taking testimony
from expert witnesses who are skilled in the art, to put themselves in
the position of one skilled in the art.39  District courts give extended
consideration to a particular set of technical issues while they take tes-
timony—consideration which likely includes factual determinations, if
only implicit ones, about technical terms and how they are used.  They
also make credibility judgments about the expert witnesses.  Com-
pared to a district court, the Federal Circuit is not well-equipped to
review more than whatever textual record is presented to it.  An ap-
proach to claim construction that puts more emphasis on the techni-
cal aspect would therefore likely counsel greater appellate deference,
as it would recognize the importance of credibility judgments as well
as the district courts’ expertise with fact-finding.40  An appellate court
36. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
37. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
38. Moore, supra note 34, at 18. R
39. To some extent, district courts can put technical decisions in the hands of technical
experts by appointing special masters. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.  If anything, this reinforces the
point: it is another way in which district courts are better situated than the Federal Circuit
to grapple with technical issues.
40. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he trial judge’s major role is the determina-
tion of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.”  Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).  This is why factual findings by district courts
are reviewed for clear error even when they do not involve credibility determinations. Id.
at 574–75.
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that emphasized the technical nature of patent documents would
likely review claim interpretation only for clear error.41
B. De Novo as a Default
The previous Section noted that there are some good reasons to
treat patents as legal documents whose construction is a matter of law.
It also observed that patents are technical documents, and appellate
judges who are experts in patent law but not “skilled in the art” are
suboptimal decisionmakers about technical issues.  How can the le-
gal/technical dichotomy be resolved?
In some sense, the dichotomy is unresolvable.  At least so long as
patent infringement suits take their current form, decisions will always
be made by judges who are not “of ordinary skill in the art.”42  Some
balance can, and must, be struck, however.  The policy considerations
underlying the existing de novo framework are strong; indeed, in
most cases, they are determinative.  As this Section argues, however, in
the exceptional case—where disputed claim terms are used in ways
idiosyncratic to a particular discipline—the Cybor model of pure de
novo review, even of underlying questions of fact, becomes inade-
quate.  Because a trial court has expertise in making factual determi-
nations, and because it can make credibility judgments about experts
that it hears directly, it is better situated to put itself in the position of
one skilled in the art, and the determinations it makes about what
terms mean to those skilled in the art and about which of multiple
meanings controls ought to be given deference.
A number of factors militate in favor of granting deference only
in the unusual case.  As described above,43 the public has an interest
in patents being objective documents with a fixed meaning discerni-
ble by reading the document alone.  Although a knowledge of patent
law is inevitably required, and the intended audience for a patent is
41. The precise standard of review is less important than the idea that some deference
is due.  I refer throughout this Article to “clear error” because it is the traditional standard
of review for factual determinations made by a trial judge. Id. at 575; see also infra note 88 R
(listing contexts in which a standard of review other than clear error is applied to factual
findings).
42. Some commentators have suggested changing the existing system, through legisla-
tive changes that grant the Patent and Trademark Office more ability to find facts, through
an administrative opposition proceeding, and through such proposals as creating special-
ized patent courts at the trial level. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003) (highlighting
possibilities to close the gap between the judiciary and legislative policymakers).  The mer-
its of such proposals are beyond the scope of this Article; my focus is limited to possible
judicial changes to the Cybor and Markman de novo review regime.
43. See supra Part II.A.
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persons of ordinary skill in the art,44 this interest is still best served any
time the claim construction inquiry is limited to intrinsic evidence.45
A trial judge has no particular advantage over an appellate judge in
reviewing this intrinsic evidence, if that is as far as a claim construc-
tion inquiry goes; all the evidence is in documentary form and is di-
rectly available.  Moreover, the public interest in knowing the scope of
patent claims is also furthered by uniformity in how a given patent is
construed, which in turn is enhanced by treating claim construction as
a matter of binding legal precedent rather than a factual issue that
must be reexamined anew when new parties litigate a patent for the
first time.46  For these reasons, the Federal Circuit has consistently
held that when the meaning of a patent claim is clear from the intrin-
sic evidence, claims should be construed with respect to that intrinsic
evidence, and resort to extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony is
not just unnecessary, but it is improper.47  An extension of this logic
supports the conclusion—implicitly recognized by the Phillips court—
that even if the specification is to be privileged over dictionaries, dic-
tionaries should be privileged over other extrinsic evidence because
44. See supra note 31; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 R
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (noting that disputed terms in claim
construction are interpreted based on the objective knowledge of one of ordinary skill in
the art).
45. Arguably, considering prosecution history to be “intrinsic evidence” undermines
this goal because it is much less accessible than the patent document itself, even if it is
obtainable and a matter of public record.  Partly on this basis Professor Thomas has argued
that use of prosecution history is misplaced in claim construction. See Thomas, supra note
32, at 200–04. R
Even so, the availability of the prosecution history as public record is the traditional
justification for using it to construe patent claims. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman
Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  A sufficiently diligent member of the
public could, in principle, consult the prosecution history before embarking on a poten-
tially infringing activity.  Likewise, the prosecution history is as easily available for Federal
Circuit judges to review as for district judges.
46. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996) (giving
stare decisis effect to issues of claim construction); cf. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ.
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331–33, 349–50 (1971) (holding that collateral estoppel may
be asserted against a party to the original suit in which an issue is decided, but not against
others).  The benefit of uniformity also derives from the Federal Circuit’s national jurisdic-
tion. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
Part III.B.2 will discuss in greater detail the linkage between stare decisis and de novo
review.  In brief, stare decisis is premised on the ideas that lower courts cannot bind higher
courts, and that decisions about legal issues are entitled to precedential effect. See Nat’l
Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).  If the decision of a lower court receives deference and is adopted by the Fed-
eral Circuit without a de novo review, the decision effectively has a precedential effect that
outweighs its author’s place in the hierarchy of courts. See infra Part III.B.2.
47. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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dictionaries “ha[ve] the value of being an unbiased source ‘accessible
to the public in advance of litigation.’”48
Even where the intrinsic evidence does not reveal the meaning of
patent claim terms, expert technical knowledge is often unnecessary
when resolving ambiguities and defining claim terms.  The reason for
this is simple: the disputed claim terms, even for technical patents, are
often not terms of art, but rather are ordinary English words given
their everyday meanings.49  When technical meanings are not impli-
cated, there is no reason to treat construction of patent documents
any differently from the construction of any other objective legal doc-
ument, such as a statute.  In other words, there is no separate techni-
cal conception of many disputed claim terms; in these cases, the legal
conception of the patent document controls.
This understanding is likely part of what motivated the Federal
Circuit’s pre-Phillips holdings that “[d]ictionaries are always available
to the court to aid in the task of determining meanings that would
have been attributed by those of skill in the relevant art to any dis-
puted terms used by the inventor in the claims.”50  In Texas Digital
Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,51 the Federal Circuit emphasized the
availability of dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises and specifically
held that they are available at any time to both trial and appellate
courts equally, whether or not offered into evidence by a party.52  As
such, the court questioned the appropriateness of labeling such
48. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585).  Compare this statement to Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19, which
enumerates the many disadvantages of expert testimony.
Of course, dictionaries and expert testimony are hardly the only extrinsic evidence
possible.  Although the Phillips court did not recognize this fact, documentary evidence
that is extrinsic to a patent but contemporaneous with it would seem likely to avoid many
of the disadvantages of expert testimony.  The weight that such evidence deserves will no
doubt be explored in cases brought by prudent post-Phillips litigants.  But to the extent that
the application of such evidence requires an essentially factual inquiry into what an ordi-
nary artisan would understand a patent to mean at the time it was written or issued, the use
of such other extrinsic evidence should also be entitled to deferential review on appeal.
49. See, e.g., Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1369–70, 1373–74 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (construing, in a case about the manufacture of MOSFETs (a type of high-power
transistor), the term “adjoining” as used in its ordinary sense of “touching or bounding at a
point or a line”); see also Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles
and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 876–79
(2005) (criticizing International Rectifier’s use of dictionaries to construe common English
claim terms).
50. Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6).
51. 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
52. Id. at 1202–03.
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sources as “evidence” at all, much less as “extrinsic evidence.”53  In-
stead, the court treated dictionaries almost as it would treat a source
of law, like a case, of which a court would always be permitted to take
judicial notice.
In Phillips, the Federal Circuit retreated somewhat from its hold-
ing in Texas Digital.54  Although it did not overrule Texas Digital out-
right, it stated that “the methodology it adopted placed too much
reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises, and ency-
clopedias and too little on intrinsic sources, in particular the specifica-
tion and prosecution history.”55  When construing patents, it stated,
one should place the greatest weight on “how the patentee used the
claim term in the claims, specification, and prosecution history, rather
than starting with a broad [dictionary] definition and whittling it
down.”56  Notably, however, the Phillips court explicitly declined to
preclude the use of dictionaries or to disavow its holding in Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,57 that:
[J]udges are free to consult dictionaries and technical trea-
tises “at any time in order to better understand the underly-
ing technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions
when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary defi-
nition does not contradict any definition found in or ascer-
tained by a reading of the patent documents.”58
Although both Vitronics and the Texas Digital line of cases have
acknowledged the utility of general and technical dictionaries—the
dictionaries cited in Texas Digital itself were two dictionaries of elec-
tronics59—the terms that courts have most often looked to dictiona-
ries to define have tended not to be technical ones.  For instance,
Texas Digital employed dictionaries to define “activate” and “display,”
53. Id.  The Texas Digital court noted that
[a]s resources and references to inform and aid courts and judges in the
understanding of technology and terminology, it is entirely proper for both trial
and appellate judges to consult these materials at any stage of a litigation, regard-
less of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or not.  Thus, cate-
gorizing them as “extrinsic evidence” or even a “special form of extrinsic
evidence” is misplaced and does not inform the analysis.
Id. at 1203.
54. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
55. Id. at 1320.
56. Id. at 1321.
57. 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
58. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–23 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6).
59. Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1206 (citing MODERN DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 20 (6th
ed. 1984) (defining “activate”)), 1209 (citing ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 147
(3d ed. 1985) (defining “display”)).
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neither of which had a meaning that diverged from the everyday
one.60  Appellate judges are just as qualified to read, interpret, and
apply ordinary English dictionary definitions as are trial judges.  Inter-
preting English text in light of dictionary definitions does not make
use of a trial judge’s expertise in fact-finding, and it does not require
the consideration of evidence to which the trial judge has had more
thorough and direct exposure.61  As Judge Linn pointed out in Texas
Digital, dictionaries have historically been considered to be acceptable
sources for judges to consult when construing other documents as a
matter of law, including both statutes and contracts.62
It is thus an exceptional case in which resort to truly extrinsic
evidence, such as expert testimony, is necessary.  This is consonant
with the observation of the Vitronics court that intrinsic evidence alone
is usually sufficient.63  In these cases, claim construction reduces to a
matter of law, and de novo review is therefore logical and appropriate.
As the Federal Circuit has observed, however, expert testimony is
necessary sometimes.  Claim terms may be ambiguous; it may be un-
clear which of several definitions apply; or claim terms may be used by
those skilled in the art—particularly in rapidly evolving fields—in ways
that are poorly reflected by published dictionaries and by the intrinsic
evidence.64  Indeed, the renewed emphasis in Phillips on considering
the “ordinary meaning” of a claim term to be “its meaning to the ordi-
nary artisan after reading the entire patent,” rather than “the meaning
of the term in the abstract, out of its particular context,” renders it,
perhaps, more likely that a court will have to resort to such evidence
than under a pro-dictionary Texas Digital conception of the art of
60. Id.
61. There may be occasions in which use of a dictionary requires the resolution of
some predicate factual question, such as whether a general dictionary or a technical trea-
tise should control, or which of a number of definitions is more likely to be what a person
skilled in the art might have meant.  In these cases, there may be a reason to defer to trial
court fact-findings even when the trial court has used a dictionary rather than heard testi-
mony from an expert witness.  However, it would not be the interpretation of a dictionary
definition that would receive deference; rather, it would be the resolution of the predicate
question.
62. Id. at 1203; see also Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 397 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing three general-purpose dictionaries to define “court” for purposes of
statutory interpretation).
63. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence
alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.  In such circumstances, it is
improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.”).
64. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(observing the necessity of extrinsic evidence when claim terms are ambiguous or terms of
art).
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claim construction—the court, after all, is not an “ordinary artisan.”65
Faced with the not-uncommon situation of a patent specification that
does not speak to a claim term and a proffered dictionary definition
of that term, a court following Texas Digital might simply adopt the
dictionary definition, but a court following Phillips—and mindful of
Phillips’s cautionary notes about the importance of context—might
need additional extrinsic evidence to determine whether a diction-
ary’s definition is really what an “ordinary artisan” would have meant.
One example of the difficulty of adopting the viewpoint of an
“ordinary artisan” is the case of Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co.66 In Pitney Bowes, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
had properly taken and considered expert testimony on the way that
persons of ordinary skill in the art (there, the digital printing art) con-
ventionally measured the size of a spot of light.67  Although “size”
would seem to be a straightforward and nontechnical term, light spots
are fuzzy; the size of a spot can be measured in different ways.  Of
particular interest was whether the size of a spot varied with its inten-
sity.68  If a spot was defined by the area in which light intensity ex-
ceeded a certain percentage of the maximum, then varying the
intensity would not alter the spot size, whereas if a spot was defined by
the area in which light intensity exceeded a fixed threshold, varying
the intensity would alter the size of the spot.69  The district court took
expert testimony on this question, and one expert testified that al-
though the percentage-based definition of size better accorded with
usage in optics and with common English, as a term of art in the digi-
tal printing field, spot size was usually measured with respect to a fixed
light intensity: only where the light is strong enough is printer toner
deposited.70
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit in Pitney Bowes held that the ques-
tion of how light spot sizes were measured in the art was irrelevant.
On the basis of the written description, it held that the disputed use of
“spots” did not refer to light spots at all, but rather to the “discharged
area on the photoreceptor.”71  However, Pitney Bowes’s spots remain a
good example of how expert testimony might be appropriately used
during claim construction, not merely to inform the judge about the
65. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
66. 182 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
67. Id. at 1306–09.  The relevant claim language was “spots of different sizes.” Id. at
1302.
68. Id. at 1306–07.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1313.
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general state of the art,72 but to give an understanding of how specific
terms are used and understood by those skilled in the art.  The sizes of
spots of light, not just spots of discharged photoreceptor material,
were referred to in the Pitney Bowes patent—just not in the disputed
claims—and the interpretation of the term remained relevant to col-
lateral arguments about whether the claim construction excluded the
preferred embodiment.73  To define the size of a light spot, the dis-
trict court had little choice but to rely on expert testimony and choose
among conflicting experts with differing views on common usage in
the digital printing art.  Thus, contrary to the Supreme Court’s con-
clusory statement in Markman, defining “spot size” as to a light spot
required a credibility determination that was not “subsumed within
the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required
by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a
way that comports with the instrument as a whole.”74
72. In an unusual statement of “additional views” on Pitney Bowes, Judge Rader, with
Judge Plager concurring, discussed the circumstances in which expert testimony is
permissible:
The process of claim construction at the trial court level will often benefit from
expert testimony which may (1) supply a proper technological context to under-
stand the claims (words often have meaning only in context), (2) explain the
meaning of claim terms as understood by one of skill in the art (the ultimate
standard for claim meaning), and (3) help the trial court understand the patent
process itself (complex prosecution histories—not to mention specifications—are
not familiar to most trial courts).
Id. at 1314 (Rader, J., additional views) (citation omitted).  Only the second of these di-
rectly constitutes construing the claims, and presumably corresponds to the “rare” situa-
tion in Vitronics in which expert testimony is permissible to construe claims that are
ambiguous based on the intrinsic evidence.
73. Id. at 1309.
74. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996).  Indeed, in an-
other recent Federal Circuit opinion, the court remanded a case to the district court spe-
cifically so that it could take expert testimony to determine how one of ordinary skill in the
art would construe a claim term:
Unfortunately, on the record before us, we are unable to say with certainty
whether or not one of skill in the art would understand that a power supply is
designed to provide a constant voltage to a circuit.  Given the complex technol-
ogy involved in this case, we think that this matter can only be resolved by further
evidentiary hearings, including expert testimony, before the district court.
NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  As in
Pitney Bowes, the court ultimately avoided the question that required expert testimony
rather than resolve it as a subsidiary fact issue. See NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsys-
tems, Inc., No. 98-699-KAJ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8054, at *44–46 (D. Del. May 9, 2003)
(finding that the expert testimony was ultimately unhelpful, and that the use of “power
supply” in the specification rendered the construction adequately clear), aff’d, 110 F.
App’x 103 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  Again, however, the potential utility of expert testimony in
claim construction, and the concomitant need for credibility determinations, is apparent.
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Inquiring of experts how terms are used in the art is a quintessen-
tially factual inquiry, and may involve a credibility judgment that an
appellate court is ill-equipped to review from a written record.  Such
judgments are ordinarily reviewed with deference, even when made by
a judge rather than a jury.75  Indeed, appellate deference to trial court
fact-finding traditionally has not been limited to credibility determina-
tions, in part because even where credibility is not at issue, trial judges
are more experienced than appellate judges at fact-finding.76  The ap-
pellate court, of course, may reverse such findings when indeed they
appear to be clearly erroneous based on the transcripts available to
the appellate court or when the trial judge has misapplied the law—
such as in cases where, under Vitronics, resorting to expert testimony
to construe claims is erroneous to begin with.
Moreover, trial judges have procedural advantages over appellate
judges when it comes to understanding extrinsic evidence and evaluat-
ing terminology from the standpoint of a person of ordinary skill in
an art.  Trial judges can schedule multiple hearings, of arbitrary
length, on specific issues about which they are having difficulty; they
can improve their own understanding by interactively questioning ex-
pert witnesses themselves; they can more easily examine physical evi-
dence, such as mechanical devices; and they can adopt flexible
techniques for improving the accuracy of their rulings by, for in-
stance, circulating draft claim constructions before Markman hear-
ings.77  To be sure, all of these techniques establish a record from
which an appellate court could reason independently, but there is lit-
tle reason to privilege an appellate court’s efforts to adopt the stand-
75. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
76. Id. at 574–75.  The application of appellate deference to a trial court’s efforts to
determine what a term means to a person of ordinary skill in the art, then, is not restricted
to cases in which a court must consider the demeanor of dueling expert witnesses, a set of
cases which, one hopes, are rare. See supra note 61.  It is properly applied to any case in R
which a trial court must look to extrinsic evidence outside the four corners of the patent
(and prosecution history).
Of course, in the case of the Federal Circuit, one might question whether most Fed-
eral Circuit judges’ greater experience with technical topics and with patents more gener-
ally outweighs the greater experience of a district judge with fact-finding.  It probably does
not—the concern here is not with patents or patent law, but rather with understanding a
discipline other than law, as best one can, through the eyes of someone who is skilled in
that other discipline.  The necessity and difficulty of doing this is not unique to patent law;
consider, for example, determinations as to whether an individual has behaved reasonably
by the standards of his profession, as might arise in a medical malpractice context.
77. For an example of a district judge who has experimented with this latter technique,
apparently with positive results, see Maytag Corp. v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 411 F.
Supp. 2d 1008, 1015–16 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
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point of a person of ordinary skill in the art over a trial court’s: the
issue is not a matter of legal expertise.
Relatedly, granting clear error deference to subsidiary questions
of fact has the advantage that it solidifies trial rulings upon which the
parties have spent considerable resources.  One major argument for
clear error review of fact-finding, even where the fact-finding depends
on documentary evidence that is equally accessible to an appellate
court, is that duplication of fact-finding efforts by an appellate court
squanders resources without improving accuracy.78  The Federal Cir-
cuit has been widely criticized for the frequency with which it reverses
district court claim constructions after an expensive trial.79  Because
subsidiary questions of fact would be dispositive only in a minority of
cases, reviewing them for clear error would probably not significantly
improve the overall reversal rate.  But it would probably improve the
reversal rate—without damaging accuracy—in cases involving highly
technical patents, which are among the most complicated and expen-
sive of cases.80  It would also grant deference to those Markman pro-
ceedings that are most expensive—a change that would prove
particularly valuable if one of the various proposals for more interloc-
utory appeals of claim construction were followed and claim construc-
tions were made appealable more often before a full trial.81  Thus,
even if it only applies to a small subset of cases, appellate deference to
subsidiary questions of fact during claim construction might well pro-
vide a nontrivial overall increase in judicial efficiency.
The sort of “mixed inquiry” in which clear error deference is
granted to factual findings that form only a small portion of a broader
question of law sounds convoluted, but it is actually quite common-
place.  As Judge Mayer observed in his opinion in Markman, even
where documents (such as contracts) are generally construed as mat-
78. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574–75; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note
to 1985 amendment (commenting on the public’s interest in trial courts being the fact-
finders).
79. Moore, supra note 34, at 2–3; Rai, supra note 42, at 1058; see also Christian A. Chu, R
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1075, 1104 (2001) (stating that the Federal Circuit’s claim construction reversal rate is
44%); Andrew T. Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Show-
ing the Need for Clear Guidance From the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 745–46
(2003) (finding a reversal rate of 41.5% in patent cases decided in 2001).
80. See Rai, supra note 42, at 1066 (noting that patent infringement suits are a particu- R
larly expensive mechanism for mediating disputes about complex technology).  Of course,
not all high-technology cases require resolution of subsidiary questions of fact, see supra
note 49 and accompanying text, but this is not necessary for the reversal rate to improve. R
81. See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 378 (proposing that a losing party be allowed to appeal a Markman
order as a matter of right).
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ters of law and their constructions are reviewed de novo, their con-
structions have long been considered to turn on subsidiary questions
of fact where terms are “obscure and indeterminate”82 or “contain
technical words, or terms of art.”83  Indeed, contract interpretation
hinges on subsidiary factual determinations whenever a contract is
held to be ambiguous; then and only then is extrinsic evidence as to
the intent of the parties admissible, and then and only then are find-
ings about the interpretation of the contract reviewed for clear error
by appellate courts.84  There are good reasons not to treat patents the
same way—unlike contracts, patents are construed based on “what a
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to
mean,”85 not on the drafters’ intentions, because patents bind the
general public rather than just private parties.  The point here, rather,
is that there are other examples of “mixed inquiries” on appellate re-
view.  Indeed, even among patent law doctrines, several issues are con-
sidered matters of law and reviewed de novo but nonetheless depend
on underlying factual questions that are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard: the public use bar,86 the on sale bar,87 and
obviousness.88
82. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Brown & Co. v. M’Gran, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 479, 493 (1840)), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
83. Id. (quoting Goddard v. Foster, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 123, 142 (1872)).
84. See, e.g., Thatcher v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 397 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
see also Sy-Lene of Wash., Inc. v. Starwood Urban Retail II, LLC, 829 A.2d 540, 546 (Md.
2003) (a state court example describing this as the “objective” theory of contract
interpretation).
85. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
86. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
87. Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
88. Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 886 (Fed. Cir.
1988).  Note that in some cases—where the factual determinations are made by a jury or by
certain tribunals such as the International Trade Commission—the standard of review is
not clear error. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (standard of review for jury findings is whether “a reasonable jury could infer” them
from the evidence), vacated on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006); Comm. for Fairly
Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States, 372 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stan-
dard of review for ITC determinations is whether the determinations are supported by
substantial evidence).  The distinctions among deferential standards of review are not im-
portant to the argument here.
Also, the fact that the proposed approach to deferential review has been used in other
contexts does not necessarily mean that it works well or is without controversy in those
other contexts. See generally William H. Burgess, Comment, Simplicity at the Cost of Clarity:
Appellate Review of Claim Construction and the Failed Promise of Cybor, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 763,
769–70 (2004) (discussing evolution and merits of the “mixed standard of review” for
obviousness).
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Thus, reviewing subsidiary factual issues in claim construction
deferentially would be neither unusual nor impractical.  The most
sensible approach to claim construction is to treat de novo review as a
sort of default rule, applied in the majority of cases in which its bene-
fits—including the ability of the skilled public to construe patent
claims simply by reading the patent89 and uniform interpretation of
those claims by courts—are attainable without great cost.  The Federal
Circuit would then defer to factual findings only in the exceptional
cases in which they were necessary for a district court to understand
how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the
claims of a patent.  In these latter cases, the costs of de novo review—
including inaccurate determination of technical issues and wasted
trial-level judicial and litigant resources—outweigh the benefits.
III. THE DEFERENCE THAT PRECEDENT REQUIRES AND HOW TO
FIX IT
Assuming that some deference should, for policy reasons, be
given to “underlying factual determinations”90 in at least the excep-
tional claim construction appeal, there remains the question of
whether the Federal Circuit is free to grant such deference by ruling
en banc in an appropriate case, or whether such deference is incom-
patible with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman.91 Phillips
Question 7 directed parties to brief the issue of whether a grant of
such deference is compatible with Markman and with Cybor.92  Some
parties briefed the question as though there was no obstacle;93 one
suggested that such deference was compatible not only with Markman
89. The skilled public would have to be able to determine whether a patent can be
construed on its face, or whether underlying factual findings are necessary.  The benefit of
drawing the line where Vitronics did is that if a claim term is unambiguous from the intrin-
sic evidence, potential infringers can rely on the unambiguous construction.  If claim
terms are ambiguous, then even with the present system of de novo review and stare deci-
sis, patentees must wait for a patent to be construed in court at least once, or incur high
litigation costs themselves.
90. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting
from order granting rehearing en banc).
91. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
92. “Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., is it appropriate for this
court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings?  If so,
on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?” Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1383
(citations omitted).
93. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Connecticut Intellectual Property Law Ass’n, supra
note 14, at 10–11. R
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but also, possibly, with Cybor;94 and another argued that Cybor is suffi-
ciently recent that stare decisis should counsel against overruling it,
but that Cybor precluded deferential appellate review.95  In all these
cases, however, the wording of the Federal Circuit’s question—and
the consequent briefing of the parties—assumed that Cybor would re-
main good law.  A broader question—and perhaps a better ques-
tion—is whether even overruling Cybor is sufficient, or whether
overruling or at least clarifying Markman is necessary at the level of the
Supreme Court.
This Part considers these issues in turn.  First, Section A briefly
argues that, contrary to the statements of a few Federal Circuit judges,
Cybor is incompatible with any grant of deference to trial court rulings.
Section B then argues that two different, interrelated aspects of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Markman compel de novo review of pat-
ent claim constructions on appeal: first, Markman’s admittedly ambig-
uous categorization of claim construction as a matter of law, and
second, Markman’s statement that stare decisis ought to apply to claim
interpretation.  Lastly, Section C argues that Markman’s stare decisis
holding makes little sense and that the two aspects of Markman should
be clarified or overruled by the Supreme Court.  It further argues that
although the arguments for treating claim construction as a matter of
law in the ordinary case are compelling, efforts by a judge to deter-
mine what terminology means within a particular art on the basis of
extrinsic evidence should be granted deference, as explained above in
Part II.
A. What Cybor Compels
Cybor held explicitly that “claim construction is purely a matter of
law” and that the Federal Circuit “reviews the district court’s claim
construction de novo on appeal.”96  It further held that “[n]othing in
the . . . [Markman] opinion supports the view that the Court endorsed
94. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Sughrue Mion, PLLC at 16–19, Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286), available at http://
patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/sughrue_mion_pllc.pdf.  The Sughrue Mion brief is a
bit ambiguous as to its position; it characterizes various concurrences and dissents as hav-
ing “expressed doubt as to the reasoning of Cybor,” but most of the statements it cites
appear to be attempts to reconcile Cybor with some deference.
95. See Brief for Amicus Curiae The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York in Support
of Neither Party at 16–18, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Nos. 03–1269, 03–1286), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/
new_york_city_association_of_the_bar.pdf.
96. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc)).
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[the position] that claim construction may involve subsidiary or un-
derlying questions of fact. . . .  [W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a
purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal
including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim
construction.”97
Nonetheless, some Federal Circuit concurrences have suggested
that Cybor does permit some implicit deference, even if not overtly
recognized as such.98  Judge Bryson emphasized in his Cybor concur-
rence that “the rule that claim construction is an issue of law does not
mean that [the Federal Circuit] intend[s] to disregard the work done
by district courts in claim construction or that [it] will give no weight
to a district court’s conclusion as to claim construction.”99  Judge
Bryson went on to cite several examples of situations in which appel-
late courts, while ruling de novo on lower-court decisions of law,
nonetheless granted some implicit deference: the Supreme Court de-
ferring to regional circuits on issues of state law in states within the
circuit; the Federal Circuit deferring to the Board of Contract Appeals
on issues of contract interpretation; and the Supreme Court leaving
patent questions to the Federal Circuit.100  Judge Plager articulated a
similar belief, arguing that even under a de novo standard of review,
the trial judge’s rulings will “carry weight.”101  And in Phillips, Judge
Lourie noted that “even though claim construction is a question of
law, reviewable . . . without formal deference, I do believe that we
ought to lean toward affirmance of a claim construction in the ab-
sence of a strong conviction of error.”102
Despite these generalized statements, however, the Federal Cir-
cuit has not generally granted any deference to subsidiary findings,
implicitly or explicitly.  Notably, all of these observations about the
possibility that some deference can be applied even under Cybor have
come in concurrence or dissent; the Federal Circuit has never recog-
nized the possibility of deference under Cybor in a panel opinion.  The
97. Id. at 1455–56.
98. See generally Brief for Amicus Curiae Sughrue Mion, supra note 94, at 17–18. R
99. 138 F.3d at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring).
100. Id.; cf. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (holding that al-
though courts of appeals review de novo district courts’ state law determinations, that de
novo review “necessarily entails a careful consideration of the district court’s legal analysis,
and an efficient and sensitive appellate court at least will naturally consider this analysis in
undertaking its review”).
101. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring).
102. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Lourie, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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high reversal rate in patent cases also strongly suggests that the Fed-
eral Circuit does not, in practice, “lean towards affirmance.”103
Regardless, even if it were to be adopted by the court, such a
vague approach is an incomplete solution.  As discussed above in Part
II, what is needed is not an increased hesitation to reverse district
courts—or at least, not just that—but rather a framework that permits
the benefits of fully independent de novo review in the common case
and the benefits of deferential review when the technical aspects of a
patent trump its legal aspects.  Yet Cybor permits nothing of the sort; it
explicitly dismissed a suggestion that “allegedly fact-based questions”
be treated any differently from the rest of the claim construction anal-
ysis.104  Thus, for the Federal Circuit to grant district courts the
greater deference that Part II advocated, Cybor must be overruled.105
Cybor resolved the question of deference in terms too explicit to
ignore.
Two concluding notes on Cybor bear mention.  First, as suggested
in the New York City Bar Association’s amicus brief in Phillips,106 there
are prudential reasons why overruling Cybor at the Federal Circuit
level is less than desirable. Cybor may have been incorrect, at least in
its extreme rejection of any possibility of formalized deference, but
circumstances have not changed in the few years since it was decided
that would ordinarily warrant a departure from the principle of stare
decisis.107  On the other hand, and second, Cybor’s statement that
claim construction is to be reviewed de novo is arguably dictum.  The
standard of review was not necessary to its outcome: Judges Mayer and
Newman voted in favor of Cybor’s ultimate judgment of affirmance de-
spite disagreeing with the majority that de novo review should ap-
ply.108  As such, the case may have been a poor vehicle for deciding
the core question of the appropriate standard of review for the Fed-
103. See supra note 79. R
104. 138 F.3d at 1455–56.
105. Like all decisions of the Federal Circuit, Cybor may be overruled by the Federal
Circuit sitting en banc. See George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348,
1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Panel Discussion on Intra-Circuit Conflicts, 11 FED. CIR. B.J.
623, 648 (2002) (quoting Judge Michel as saying “the later en banc always trumps the
earlier en banc”).
106. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 95, R
at 16–17.
107. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (stating that although “judicial departure from
stare decisis always requires ‘special justification,’ the ‘conceptual underpinnings’ of th[e]
precedent [in the case at hand] ha[d] significantly diminished in force,” such that the
failure to produce exculpatory opinion letters no longer warranted the “adverse inference
that an opinion was or would have been unfavorable” (citations omitted)).
108. 138 F.3d at 1463–64 (Mayer, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR104.txt unknown Seq: 24  8-DEC-06 11:56
2006] DEFERENCE IN PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION APPEALS 217
eral Circuit, but this fact makes overruling it correspondingly easier, if
overruling is formally necessary at all.  Either way, however, as Section
B will argue, Markman likely needs overruling or clarification by the
Supreme Court, and because Cybor’s holding has never been decided
at that level, the prudential concerns do not apply to a Supreme Court
decision that compels Cybor to be modified.
B. What Markman Compels
Markman is the only case in which the Supreme Court has re-
cently confronted the categorization of claim construction as a matter
of law or fact, and thus the only relevant source of binding authority
in the en banc Federal Circuit on the question of deference.  Impor-
tantly, however, Markman avoided all discussion of deference and, in-
deed, at times appeared to eschew a clear Cybor-like holding that claim
construction is a matter of pure law.109  At issue in Markman was
whether the Seventh Amendment guarantee of the right to a jury trial
in civil cases110 mandates that juries determine patent claim interpre-
tations, or whether claim interpretation can and should be left for the
judge.111  But in determining that it could and should be a matter for
the judge, the Court outlined a series of policy arguments regarding
institutional competence and the stare decisis effect of claims that
leave no room for appellate deference to trial court claim construc-
tion rulings.
109. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996) (“We
have also spoken of the line as one between issues of fact and law. . . .  But the sounder
course . . . is to classify a mongrel practice (like construing a term of art following receipt
of evidence) by using the historical method . . . .”).  Justice Souter, the author of Markman,
appears to have gone to some lengths to restrict the Court’s statement to the question of
whether claim construction is an issue for the judge or for the jury and to avoid making
clear statements categorizing claim construction as a matter of law. See, e.g., id. at 372
(“The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called patent claim . . . is a matter
of law reserved entirely for the court . . . .  We hold that the construction of a patent,
including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.”).
111. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
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1. Claim Construction as a Matter of Law
In attempting to justify deference, Federal Circuit judges112 and
commentators113 have both cited Justice Souter’s statements in
Markman that claim interpretation is a “mongrel practice” that “falls
somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical
fact.”114  However, as the Federal Circuit majority in Cybor pointed out,
even though the Supreme Court in Markman acknowledged that claim
interpretation may have factual elements in reality, the Court con-
sciously dismissed them when determining how claim interpretation
should be treated under the law.115  Justice Souter’s analysis was “func-
tional” in character and for policy reasons assigned claim construction
as a legal question for judges,116 but it did assign them to the category
of “law” rather than “fact”:
“[T]he fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determi-
nation that, as a matter of the sound administration of jus-
tice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to
decide the issue in question.”  So it turns out here, for
judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired
meaning of patent terms.
The construction of written instruments is one of those
things that judges often do and are likely to do better than
jurors . . . .117
The Supreme Court went on to state that any “credibility determi-
nations”—the archetypal factual determination118—“will be subsumed
within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole docu-
ment.”119  Justice Souter might have intended to allocate claim con-
struction to judges while retaining it as a question of fact entitled to
clear error review; after all, judges can engage in fact-finding without
112. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting from the pronouncements on
claim interpretation in the en banc opinion, concurring in the judgment, and joining part
IV of the en banc opinion) (citing Markman’s “mongrel practice” language).
113. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 42, at 1047–48 (citing Markman’s “mongrel practice” R
language).
114. Markman, 517 U.S. at 378, 388.
115. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455 (“[T]he Supreme Court was addressing under which cate-
gory, fact or law, claim construction should fall and not whether it should be classified as
having two components, fact and law.”).
116. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
117. Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
118. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985) (holding that all
factual determinations, not just credibility determinations, are reviewed for clear error, but
noting the long history of restricting clear error review to credibility determinations and
maintaining especial deference where credibility is concerned).
119. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
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juries.120  However, the language of the opinion does not support this
view.  Rather, claim construction was given to judges as an interpretive
issue uniquely within their competence as legal experts “train[ed] in
exegesis,”121 and the Court proceeded to give reasons why it
“treat[ed] interpretive issues as purely legal.”122  Under Supreme
Court precedent, legal issues, when defined as such, are reviewed by
appellate courts de novo.123
2. Estoppel Versus Stare Decisis
Another aspect of Markman bolsters the conclusion that Markman
necessarily implies de novo review: its holding that claim interpreta-
tions have stare decisis effect.124  The Markman Court highlighted the
importance of uniformity in claim construction, observing that for the
patentee, for other possible inventors, and for potential infringers
alike, “the limits of a patent must be known.”125  To this end, it argued
that treating claim construction as purely legal would enable an adju-
dicated claim construction to be considered as legal precedent.126
The Court specifically distinguished issue preclusion, in which the de-
termination of issues—including claim constructions—adjudicated in
120. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“The trial judge shall explicitly state findings of fact
and conclusions of law upon which the judge bases the verdict.  Findings of fact will not be
disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.”); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (“In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a
district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their
function is not to decide factual issues de novo.”).
121. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
122. Id. at 391.
123. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (“Independent appellate
review of legal issues best serves the dual goals of doctrinal coherence and economy of
judicial administration.”).
124. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.  Strictly speaking, Justice Souter’s opinion discussed “ap-
plication of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity
under the authority of the single appeals court.” Id. This might imply that by the term
“stare decisis,” he meant the persuasive effect of one district court’s claim construction on
another rather than the binding effect of Federal Circuit claim constructions on other
courts.  Whatever Justice Souter meant by “stare decisis,” however, it is clear that he in-
tended claim constructions ratified by the Federal Circuit to have a binding effect nation-
wide. See, e.g., Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing Markman, the court stated, “we recognize the national stare decisis effect that [Fed-
eral Circuit] decisions on claim construction have”).
125. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
126. Id. at 391; see also Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., No. 01 C 1867, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22218, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2004) (“The Supreme Court has stressed
the need for this ‘intrajurisdictional certainty’ by making claim construction a legal issue
that in turn imposes the application of stare decisis on patent interpretation, making the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction of the ’176 patent legal precedent in this case.”).
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a previous lawsuit would be considered binding upon parties to that
suit;127 in contrast, stare decisis could be asserted by any party.128
Although the exact contours of Markman stare decisis are un-
clear, it appears that the Court intended patent claim constructions by
the Federal Circuit to be binding on district courts, even in other law-
suits.129  It would be peculiar indeed for a determination made by a
district court, then affirmed by the Federal Circuit under a deferential
standard of review, to be given the effect of binding circuit precedent.
Indeed, a deferential standard of review would undermine any claim
that a claim construction was binding on future cases.
To see why this is so, consider what it means for a ruling to be
held “not clearly erroneous.”  Formally, when a judgment is affirmed
as “not clearly erroneous,” that does not imply that the affirming
court agrees with every aspect of the judgment or would have come to
the same conclusion as the district court.130  Rather, it implies only
that the judgment of the district court is not so far wrong—literally,
not so clearly erroneous—that it cannot be allowed to stand.131  An-
other trial court might confront exactly the same patent claims, yet
come to a different conclusion about their construction, either be-
cause it has heard different evidence about a dispositive underlying
factual issue or because it has made different credibility determina-
tions about the expert testimony on that issue.  Two rulings can simul-
taneously be “not clearly erroneous” even if they conflict with each
other, and the fact that a particular claim construction has been up-
127. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 317, 331–33,
349–50 (1971).
128. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
129. See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d
1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[S]tare decisis is a doctrine that binds courts to follow their
own earlier decisions or the decisions of a superior tribunal.”).  At least some district courts
appear to conclude from this principle that Federal Circuit claim constructions are bind-
ing. See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Oki Elec. Indus. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (D. Mass.
1998) (holding, in light of Markman and the general principle that Federal Circuit law is
binding on district courts as to patent law, that the Federal Circuit’s construction of two
patents was binding on the trial court in a later suit concerning those patents); Texas
Instruments, Inc. v. Linear Techs. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 2d 580, 589 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (con-
cluding that the court was not bound by the claim interpretation of a sister district court,
but implying that this reasoning only applied because the two were coordinate courts and
one was not ordinarily bound by decisions of the other).
130. See In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1402 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (observing
this logical conclusion and stating that holdings that are based on clear-error deference to
a district court are “not really holdings by appellate panels . . . .  Instead, they are holdings
that the district judges’ [decision] is not clear error”).
131. Id.
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held does not mean that another judge is bound to arrive at the same
one if the standard of review for the first ruling was deferential.
Furthermore, for stare decisis to comport with due process, it
must be restricted to questions of law that do not depend on the par-
ticular evidence presented.  Due process requires that parties to a law-
suit have an opportunity to have their claims heard;132 when stare
decisis applies a binding judicial decision to parties who did not origi-
nally litigate that decision, these due process protections would seem
to be violated,133 as they would be if claim or issue preclusion were
applied against a nonparty to the original action.134  The way out of
this dilemma is twofold.  First, stare decisis is typically seen as binding
courts rather than parties; parties remain free to challenge binding
precedent in a higher court.135  But this rationale is only effective as to
matters that the higher court is free to examine independently.  If the
ruling with stare decisis effect were based on clearly erroneous review
of an evidentiary finding, a party challenging that ruling through a
later appellate proceeding would lack the opportunity to be heard
that the original parties had, and the reviewing court, like the appel-
late court that issued the first affirmance, would be constrained in its
capacity for review.  Second, and relatedly, stare decisis is seen as ac-
ceptable because judicial rulings on questions of law are within the
discretion of the court to pronounce, they are a form of positive law-
making, and they are—in principle, at least—based on legal princi-
ples that will not change in light of new evidence.136  This rationale,
too, depends on the binding decision being a matter of pure law.
Thus, if the Supreme Court in Markman is serious in its holding
that claim constructions are entitled to stare decisis effect—and it ap-
pears to be so—then that holding implies that claim construction is
indeed a matter of pure law, reviewable de novo by appellate courts.
It follows also that if, as Part II of this Article argued above, subsidiary
findings of fact are an important part of some claim construction rul-
ings and should be reviewed deferentially, Markman must be clarified
or overruled.  The next Section will argue that the Supreme Court can
132. E.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797 & n.4 (1996).
133. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1026–28
(2003); see also Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that use of stare decisis to treat a district court decision in another district as
binding violates due process).
134. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331–33, 349–50
(1971).
135. Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365,
1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
136. Barrett, supra note 133, at 1047–60. R
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build upon Markman without overruling it entirely, so as to maintain
its goal of uniformity while permitting deference in appropriate cases.
C. How To Fix Markman
Markman’s holding that stare decisis applies to claim construction
and its statement that claim construction is a matter of law appear to
stand in the way of a sensible approach to claim construction as a
“mixed” inquiry that rightly treats patents as both the legal and the
technical documents that they are.  There are several reasons why
there is nevertheless no need for a dramatic change in, or outright
overruling of, Markman; instead, the Supreme Court can (and should,
in an appropriate case) clarify its position on claim construction by
embracing clear error review of subsidiary facts while leaving most of
Markman—with its well-placed policy concerns for uniformity and sta-
bility in patent claim interpretation—intact.137
First, Markman was primarily about the question of whether
judges or juries should construe patent claims.138  Nothing in this Arti-
cle’s proposal for clear error review of underlying facts affects the
Court’s holdings about the respective roles of judges and juries or the
Seventh Amendment.  Although the application of the Seventh
Amendment is related to a distinction between “fact” and “law,” Jus-
tice Souter explicitly noted in Markman that claim construction is a
“mongrel” between the two and, thus, that the “sounder course” is to
classify it for Seventh Amendment purposes by reference to historical
practices.139  The holding that historical practices preclude any Sev-
enth Amendment right to the jury determination of claim construc-
tions is not inconsistent with a holding that claim constructions
deserve some level of appellate deference.  The fact/law distinction
that Justice Souter held to be unhelpful in deciding the Seventh
137. Indeed, as Judge Rader observed in dissent in Cybor, purely de novo review of pat-
ent claim construction rulings has the potential to decrease, rather than increase, the stabil-
ity of the patent system—the reversal rate is so high that litigants can no longer rely on the
early determination of patent claims promised by the first Markman opinion and must
instead wait for the Federal Circuit to rule.  Worse—argued Rader, using the example of
CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, see infra note 146—even the Federal Circuit’s rulings R
have lacked stability from appeal to appeal. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1476–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting from the pronouncements on claim
interpretation in the en banc opinion, concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV of
the en banc opinion).
138. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996); see also Cybor, 138
F.3d at 1456 (en banc) (“The Court’s primary concern in [Markman] was the Seventh
Amendment issue of whether a right to a jury trial on claim construction inured to a party
due to any potential factual issues involved.”).
139. 517 U.S. at 378.
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Amendment question may retain its vitality in determining a standard
of review.  Factual and legal determinations in patent claim construc-
tion may be too finely distinguished, as a practical matter, to separate
out the former for jury determination, but they are not necessarily too
finely distinguished for an appellate court to be resistant to overturn-
ing the factual findings that a trial judge has made on the way to un-
derstanding what a skilled artisan, as opposed to a lay person, learns
from a patent.140  Moreover, the Seventh Amendment question and
the deference question are logically distinct; trial judges often serve as
factfinders and are still granted deference, and a trial judge serving in
this capacity is still able to make credibility determinations.141  Thus, it
is only the stare decisis holding (and the Court’s closely related and
absolute-sounding, but not strictly necessary, statements about claim
construction being treated as a matter of law) that is in tension with
heightened deference.
Second, even the stare decisis holding need not change in most
cases.  As discussed above,142 rare are cases in which extrinsic evi-
dence—and thus appellate deference to trial court fact-finding—are
necessary.  In most cases, claim construction will be a purely legal is-
sue and can still be granted stare decisis effect.  In the remainder of
cases, much of the claim construction process is legal in character and
can still bind future courts, even if any factual determinations require
reexamination in light of a party’s proffers of evidence.  At first, it
might seem peculiar to grant stare decisis effect only to some claim
constructions or to some portions of a claim construction opinion, but
courts often make fine-grained determinations about the extent to
which other courts’ rulings are controlling, in the contexts both of
estoppels and of the distinction between holdings and dicta.  There is
no reason to believe that such a system is unworkable, and it would
preserve a large portion of the uniformity and stability that Markman
extols.
Finally, the goals of Markman might best be served by jettisoning
the stare decisis holding entirely.  It is questionable whether stare de-
140. On the other hand, courts often give subsidiary questions of fact to juries but re-
serve the overarching questions of law for judges.  For instance, when construing contracts,
underlying factual determinations are often given to juries, even if the interpretation of
the document is ultimately a question of law for the court.  Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, 52 F.3d 967, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring in the judg-
ment), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
141. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (allocating to
the trial judge the gatekeeping function of determining whether expert testimony is
reliable).
142. See supra Part II.B.
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cisis has had the pro-uniformity effects for which the Supreme Court
hoped.  Of federal court decisions that cite Markman, only about a
dozen discuss the stare decisis effect of claim constructions,143 and
only a few of these appear to grant stare decisis effect to patent claim
constructions; the doctrine is apparently seldom used in practice.  In-
deed, even the Federal Circuit has declined to apply it.  For example,
in CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Custom Optical Frames, Inc.,144 the court
construed the claim term “elasticity” one way, solely on the basis of
intrinsic evidence.145  Yet in a subsequent case involving the same pat-
entee, the court declined to use the same construction of the same
claim term, and indeed reversed a district court opinion that had
done so.146  If the Federal Circuit is not going to give stare decisis
effect to its own claim interpretations, this eviscerates the doctrine en-
tirely: district courts have held that the stare decisis effect does not
apply to the decisions of one district court as to another,147 so the only
rulings that ordinarily have binding stare decisis effect are those of an
appellate court.148
Even if the Federal Circuit applied stare decisis more broadly,
however, doing so might be a mistake.  In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.
143. These statistics are based on a search of LexisNexis’s “Federal Court Cases, Com-
bined” database on October 29, 2006, using the following query: Markman /p patent /p
claim /p stare decisis.
144. Nos. 96-1070, 95-1486, 1996 WL 338388 (Fed. Cir. June 19, 1996).
145. Id. at *2.
146. CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1157–58 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Moore, supra note 34, at 18–21.  As Moore notes, the Federal Circuit later attempted to R
resolve the inconsistency between the two CVI/Beta cases on the grounds that the former
was in the context of a preliminary injunction proceeding. See Moore, supra note 34, at R
19–21; CVI/Beta Ventures, 112 F.3d at 1160 n.7.  It is true that the claim construction in the
preliminary injunction proceeding was, due to the early stage of the litigation, nonfinal.
CVI/Beta Ventures, 112 F.3d at 1160 n.7.  However, Moore argues, correctly in my view, that
this explanation is not compelling if claim construction is a matter of pure law and where,
as in the CVI/Beta cases, decisions are made solely on the same intrinsic evidence.  Moore,
supra note 34, at 19–21. R
147. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Dolan, No. 3:01-CV-1537-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19578, at
*5–6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2003).
148. Intriguingly, the Federal Circuit has occasionally applied stare decisis—or at least
cited to previous claim construction rulings—when construing individual claim terms,
even when those terms are used in the cited and citing opinions in two entirely different
patents and contexts. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442
F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363,
1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (construing the term “annular” in a baseball bat patent by using
International Rectifier’s construction of the same term used in a transistor patent). Wilson
Sporting Goods is even a post-Phillips opinion, in which one might expect the court to con-
strue claim terms only in context—though admittedly the court’s citation pertained to the
“ordinary and customary” meaning of the term. Id.
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Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,149 the Federal Circuit recently observed that it
could not “fully and confidently review [an] infringement judgment,
including its claim construction component” because “the record on ap-
peal contain[ed] no description of the accused infringing devices.”150
This was a striking admission that it is an oversimplification to concep-
tualize an infringement analysis as involving two separate steps—the
construction of the claims as a matter of law and the determination of
the accused device’s infringement as a matter of fact.151  Although a
patent claim has an abstract and theoretical scope that is independent
of any accused infringing embodiment, a judge (either trial or appel-
late) who endeavors to construe the claim will necessarily attempt to
do so in a way that resolves the question at hand: whether the particu-
lar accused embodiment infringes.  The claim construction that is ar-
ticulated may not unambiguously resolve whether another
embodiment, not at issue, infringes the patent.
To take a trivial example, if a claim describes a “round widget,” a
court might announce a claim construction that makes it clear that
this covers both solid circular widgets and ring-shaped widgets, for in-
stance by announcing that the claim covers “all widgets whose outer
edge is circular.”  Such a construction, however, might be counter-
productive, if not meaningless, if applied as a matter of stare decisis in
a later case where the accused widgets are spherical.
The lesson of Wilson Sporting Goods, then, is that although “a trial
court should certainly not prejudge the ultimate infringement analysis
by construing claims with an aim to include or exclude an accused
product or process, knowledge of that product or process provides
meaningful context for the first step of the infringement analysis,
claim construction.”152  Applying stare decisis effect to a claim con-
struction that has been derived in another case deprives a court of this
context.  Although the claim scope ought, in theory, to be the same,
the construction articulated by a prior court may ask and answer the
wrong questions and determine infringement only as to the wrong set
of accused embodiments.  Worse, along the way to articulating a claim
construction, a court may announce definitions of claim terms that
are not directly contested and therefore have not had the benefit of
149. 442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
150. Id. at 1330 (emphasis added).
151. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
152. Wilson Sporting Goods, 442 F.3d at 1326–27.  The court summarized this principle,
rather delphically, in a parenthetical: “while a claim is not to be construed in light of the
accused device, in an infringement case, it must inevitably be construed in context of the
accused device.” Id. at 1327 (citing SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d
1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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being refined by careful, adversarial argumentation.  The danger that
stare decisis effect will be given to such pronouncements may explain
some of the resistance to Markman’s stare decisis holding by the pat-
ent bar.153
Finally, one reason why stare decisis is so seldom used may be
that, even to the extent that its benefits outweigh its drawbacks, it is
unnecessary.  The various forms of estoppel achieve many of the same
goals while better assuring a result that has been derived in the cor-
rect context and through adversarial advocacy by the interested par-
ties.  Nonmutual collateral estoppel may always be employed against a
patentee on issues of claim construction;154 judicial estoppel may bind
a patentee to the patentee’s previous proposed constructions even
where that patentee did not originally prevail.155  Moreover, not only
are estoppel doctrines clearer, fairer, and stronger, they apply equally
to fact and to law; as such, it is likely that courts use them in prefer-
ence to stare decisis in the majority of patent cases where they are
available, and that in practice they do much of the work that the Su-
preme Court assigned to stare decisis.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given these considerations, the Supreme Court should consider
overruling the Federal Circuit’s holding in Cybor that every aspect of
claim construction is a matter of law for the court.  To accomplish
this, the Supreme Court—not the Federal Circuit—must eliminate,
modify, or clarify Markman’s stare decisis holding.  Notably, the appli-
cation of stare decisis to claim construction rulings need not disap-
pear entirely, but perhaps it would be no great loss if it did.
Whether or not the Supreme Court ultimately decides to preserve
the stare decisis effect of claim constructions, however, it ought to
grant certiorari in an appropriate patent infringement case and re-
153. One solution to this problem would be to argue that because definitions of uncon-
tested or incidental claim terms are not strictly necessary to an infringement determina-
tion, they cannot be given stare decisis effect because they amount to dicta.  Courts are
used to making fine determinations as to what statements are dicta and what are holdings,
as dicta do not give rise to stare decisis. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 714
(1993) (“Those statements are dicta . . . and thus not binding on us as stare decisis.”); U.S.
Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463 n.11 (1993) (empha-
sizing “the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta”).
To the extent that out-of-context claim construction rulings are dicta and do not give
rise to stare decisis, however, the utility of stare decisis as a source of uniformity is
undermined.
154. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331–33, 349–50
(1971).
155. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001).
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consider the implications of Markman for the standard of review. Phil-
lips was not an appropriate case;156 despite the appearance of
Question 7 in the Federal Circuit’s rehearing order,157 the trial court
in Phillips heard no expert testimony, and neither the majority nor the
dissent in the Phillips panel opinion resorted to extrinsic evidence to
conduct their claim constructions.158
The Supreme Court has recently shown signs of taking a greater
interest in patent cases and in the decisions of the Federal Circuit.159
The question of appellate deference to claim construction rulings has
created a rift within the patent community that has shown few signs of
closing in over ten years.  When a suitable case arises in which to con-
sider the question, the Court can and should step into this debate,
consider the implications of Markman, Cybor, and Phillips, and attempt
to strike a sensible balance between the conceptions of a patent as a
legal document and as a technical one.
156. Indeed, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Phillips. AWH Corp. v. Phillips,
126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006).
157. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (granting
rehearing en banc).
158. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207 passim (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
159. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 280 (“While the grant of certiorari on such an issue is itself
a significant indication of the Court’s renewed interest in patent law, other aspects of the
case reveal even more about the Court’s attitude.”).  During the October 2005 Term, the
Supreme Court decided three cases on appeal from the Federal Circuit, all about patents:
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indepen-
dent Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006); and Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S.
Ct. 980 (2006).  The Court also heard argument in a fourth case of great significance to
the patent bar, but ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. See
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (dismissing
writ of certiorari over the written dissent of three Justices).  Justice Breyer noted in this
latter dissent that “a decision from this generalist Court could contribute to the important
ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent system, as
currently administered and enforced, adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the
federal patent laws . . . embod[y].’” Id. at 2929 (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of
certiorari) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989)).  A decision from the Supreme Court on the issue presented in this Article would
likewise contribute to the ongoing debate about how the federal patent laws are to be
administered.
